





An investor initiative in permership with UNEP Finance Initiative and UN Global Compact

The Inevitable Policy Response 2021

Balancing Forecasting and Aligning – For Asset Managers

Julian Poulter, Head of Investor Relations, IPR Partner, Energy Transition Advisers https://www.linkedin.com/company/inevitable-policy-response



- RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT



PRI commissioned the Inevitable Policy Response in 2018 to advance the industry's knowledge of climate transition risk, and to support investors' efforts to incorporate climate risk into their portfolio assessments.





<u>A research partnership</u> led by Energy Transition Advisers and Vivid Economics conducts the initiative's policy research and scenario modelling and includes 2Dii, Carbon Tracker Initiative, Climate Bonds Initiative, Planet Tracker and Quinbrook Infrastructure Partners.

The consortium was given the mandate to bring leading analytic tools and an independent perspective to assess the drivers of likely policy action, and the implications on the market.











The Inevitable Policy Response: Investor Brief for Asset Managers

Who supports the Inevitable Policy Response ?

Strategic partners consisting of leading financial institutions have joined the IPR in 2021 to provide more in-depth industry input, to further strengthen its relevance to the financial industry.

BLACKROCK

FitchRatings





Sachs Asset Management

<u>Core philanthropic support</u> since IPR began in 2018. IPR is funded in part by the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation through The Finance Hub, which was created to advance sustainable finance and the ClimateWorks Foundation striving to innovate and accelerate climate solutions at scale.








How the IPR supports Asset Managers

- Provide clarity around "climate scenario" choices
- Shed insight into 1.5 degree alignment vs. maximising returns
- Detail the economic and sector-level implications
- Offer insight into product and portfolio challenges
- Provide guidance towards engagement and stewardship issues

All IPR resources are publicly available on the PRI website at: <u>https://www.unpri.org/sustainability-issues/climate-change/inevitable-policy-response</u>



The pressure on institutional investors is at an all time high





The structure of the IPR framework

Drivers of policy

- Extreme weather events
- Uninsurable world
- New climate
 research
- Impacts on security
- Civil society action
- Influence shifting
- Cheaper renewable
 energy
- Financial regulator warnings on stability
- New geopolitics of energy

IPR Policy Forecast

A high-conviction policy-based forecast of forceful policy response to climate change and implications for energy, agriculture and land use

IPR Scenarios

IPR 1°8C Forecast Policy Scenario (FPS)

A **fully integrated climate scenario** modelling the impact of the forecasted policies on the real economy up to 2050, tracing detailed effects on all emitting sectors

IPR 1.5°C RPS Scenario

A '**1.5°C Required Policy Scenario**'(1.5°C RPS) building on the IEA NZE by deepening analysis on policy, land use, emerging economies, NETs and value drivers. This can be used by those looking to align to 1.5°C


Note: IPR analyses transition risk only, not physical risk

IPR value drivers

A set of publicly available **outputs from the FPS and 1.5°C RPS** that offer significant granularity at the sector and country level allowing investors to assess their own climate risk



IPR Policy Forecast Drivers Process



Russia Ukraine War- Implications for IPR Forecasts

For IPR Forecasts we see four overarching themes at this stage:

- 1) Reinforcement of medium (3-5 Years?) and long-term term IPR renewable energy and Green Hydrogen policies and sector forecasts
- Short term (1-2 years) energy supply crisis for EU with many uncertainties and sourcing of Fossil Fuel supplies outside of Russia
- For the IPR 1.8°C Forecast Policy Scenario this means that the fossil fuel sector supply dynamics will need reassessing eg split between piped natural gas and LNG, geography of origin etc
- 4) But we do not see any divergence from trend in demand side sectors, if anything an eventual acceleration towards more green outcomes

Note that one potential outcome is an "all of the above" where fossil fuels remain longer in the system as security back up (low-capacity utilisation) and the cost is borne in effect as an energy security cost.



Investor Implications for the new geo-politics

- Strong reinforcement of IPR medium term renewables forecasts with good upside implications for renewable infrastructure and transitioning companies
- Russian exposed debt, sovereign and corporate, requires urgent analysis whilst ratings agencies calculate impact
- Net Zero aligners will miss out on fossil fuel short term boom
- Net Zero alignment even lower probability
- No divergence from trend in demand side sectors, if anything, an acceleration towards more green outcomes.
- Non aligners need to beware Capex expansion will be justified in the short term but will increase stranded asset risk
- Engagement will O&G companies use windfall for transition?



Policy developments are scored using a 10-point scale to indicate magnitude and direction of impact on IPR scenario forecasts

A 10-point scale applied to policy developments to indicate impact on IPR 1.8°C FPS policy forecasts (implications for the 1.5°C RPS policy forecasts can also be drawn)

- 0-1 indicates increasing evidence for deceleration in policy forecast
- 2-4 indicates evidence for deceleration in policy forecast
- 5 indicates **no change** in policy forecast
- 6-8 indicates evidence for acceleration policy forecast
- 9-10 indicates increasing evidence for acceleration in policy forecast

A similar 10-point scale is applied to energy/land technology developments

Scale	Details	Impact on policy forecast	
0	Evidence for significant deceleration in policy forecast	Potential for 10+ year downgrade	Greater likelihood of
1	Evidence for large deceleration in policy forecast	Potential for 10-year downgrade	2.3°C IEA STEPS ¹ scenario
2	Evidence for moderate deceleration policy forecast	Potential for 5-year downgrade	
3	Evidence for small deceleration in policy forecast	Potential for <5-year downgrade	
4	Some evidence for marginal deceleration in policy forecast	Monitor developments	
5	Confirmatory (reinforces and increases probability of 1.8°C FPS)	Does not change forecast	1.8°C IPR FPS
6	Some evidence for marginal acceleration in policy forecast	Monitor developments	
7	Evidence for small acceleration in policy forecast	Potential for <5-year upgrade	
8	Evidence for moderate acceleration in policy forecast	Potential for 5-year upgrade	
9	Evidence for large acceleration in policy forecast	Potential for 10-year upgrade	Greater likelihood of
10	Evidence for significant acceleration in policy forecast	Potential for 10+ year upgrade	1.5°C IPR RPS scenario

* The IEA's 'Stated Policy Scenario' or STEPS reflects current policy settings based on a sector-by-sector assessment of the specific policies that are in place, as well as those that have been announced by governments around the world

Between COP 26 and June 2022, majority of energy/land policy & technology developments mostly show confirmation of IPR Forecasts


Creater likelihood of 2.3°C IEA STEPS* scenario 1.8°C IPR FPS Greater likelihood of 1.5°C IPR RPS scenario Significant deceleration Large deceleration Moderate deceleration Small deceleration Marginal micreased probability of 1.8°C FPS Marginal acceleration Small acceleration Moderate acceleration Large acceleration Significant acceleration Score Image: Confirmatory deceleration Moderate deceleration Small deceleration Moderate acceleration Small acceleration Moderate acceleration Large acceleration Significant acceleration Score Image: Confirmatory deceleration Moderate deceleration Small deceleration Moderate acceleration Large acceleration Small acceleration Moderate acceleration Large acceleration Score Image: Confirmatory deceleration Image: Confirmatory deceleration Morginal acceleration Moderate acceleration Large acceleration Small acceleration Moderate acceleration Large Moderate acceleration													
Significant deceleration Large deceleration Moderate deceleration Small deceleration Marginal deceleration Marginal acceleration Small acceleration Moderate acceleration Large acceleration Significant acceleration Score 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10 Global 1 1 1 3 1 6 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 1		Greater likeli	nood of 2.3°C l	1.	1.8°C IPR FPS Greater likelihood of 1.5°C IPR RPS scena			RPS scenario					
GlobalImage: state stat							(increased probability of	acceleratio					
USAImage: state s	Score	0	1	2	3	4	6	6	7	8	9	10	Т
ChinaIsing and	Global					1	11	3					:
EUImage: selection of the select	US				1	2	12						:
GermanyImage: selection of the s	China						7	3					
FranceImage: selection of the se	EU						7						
UKImage: selection of the select	Germany						4	2					
BrazilIndia <th< td=""><td>France</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>1</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></th<>	France							1					
India									1				
Indonesia						2		1					
CanadaImage: Second													
NigeriaImage: South AfricaImage: South Africa <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>													
South AfricaSouth AfricaImage: South Africa													
Saudi Arabia Image: Comparison of the													
South Korea Image: Constraint of the second se													
Japan Japan 2													
Total 1 5 68 10 1					1	F		10	1				1

i. This assessment covers the period from COP 26 to mid-June 2022

Q1 & Q2 2022

ii. The IEA's 'Stated Policy Scenario' or STEPS reflects current policy settings based on a sector-by-sector assessment of the specific policies that are in place, as well as those that have been announced by governments around the world 1

Climate transition presents challenges and investment opportunities for Asset Managers



Likely outcomes:

- Reduce emissions at the portfolio level
- Questionable impact in real world without reallocation of capital to low carbon assets
- Return loss if RPS 1.5 policies do not materialise
- Possible unintended consequences of divestment

Desired and likely outcome:

- Reduce emissions at the portfolio level but less than RPS
- Maximisation of risk and return
- Real world emission reduction aligning with policy materialisation



IPR Value Add


Characteristics of Scenarios	IPR	Most "aligned" Scenarios
A high conviction policy-based forecast with realistic constraints		
Transparent		
Applicable to TCFD reporting		
Complete forecast includes macroeconomic, energy and land use models		
Covers all regions of the world		
Fully integrating land-use		
Built for investors with investor input		
Usable for stress testing		INEVITAE POLICY RESPON

Policy methodology for the IPR 1.8C FPS 2021 vs 1.5C RPS

Key Differences	1.8°C FPS	1.5°C RPS
Carbon Prices	Forecasted timeframe, varying by region	Similar to FPS: Extremely rapid transition required for RPS will be challenging to achieve through carbon pricing mechanisms, beyond what is already expected in the IPR FPS 2021
Policy Drivers	Based on realistic forecasts, within political reality as well as technology and consumer changes	More interventionist top down policies: Performance standards (bans) and/or more direct subsidies
Announcements	By 2025 Paris Ratchet	ASAP; by 2023 Paris Stocktake
Implementation	In line with political reality	Immediately upon announcement

INEVITABLE

Scenario market in terms of emissions outcomes in energy related sectors




O INEVITABLE POLICY RESPONSE

* Data on IEA CO2 pathways are published in 5-year intervals ** IPR FPS 2019 was modelled in 5-year increments

Note: IEA scenario data based on May 2021 Net Zero Emissions report; in WEO2021, IEA APC is renamed Announced Pledges Scenario (APS), with a slightly modified emissions pathway

Forecasted scenario ambitious but still leaves 30% (8 GtCO₂) gap, relative to IPR 1.5°C Required Policy Scenario, primarily due to timing of policy implementation



Policies with the greatest 2020-2050 Gt reduction between IPR 1.5°C RPS and IPR 1.8°C FPS 2021

Rank	Policy	Country	IPR 1.5°C RPS vs IPR 1.8°C FPS (2021 Gt reduction)
1	Coal phase out	China	40.0
2	End deforestation and NBS	Sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia and Latin America	19.0
3	100% clean industry	China	19.0
4	Coal phase out	India	14.1
5	100% clean industry	India	8.3
6	100% clean industry	MENA	7.2
7	100% clean power	MENA	6.7
8	Fossil vehicle phase out	China	6.3
9	Coal phase out	Indonesia	5.4
10	100% clean industry	South East Asia	5.2

Note: Emissions reduction are approximate and include come additional sector-specific CO₂ reduction such as energy efficiency



Example of differences between 1.8°C FPS and 1.5°C RPS in key sector – Unabated Coal

Phase out of existing unabated coal

	Timeline							annual reduction*			
	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050	2055	2060	RPS	FPS
AU			RPS		FPS					10%	5%
BRA				RPS		FPS				7%	4%
CAN		RPS	FPS							20%	10%
CHI				RPS		FPS				7%	4%
CSA				RPS		FPS				7%	4%
EEU			RPS		FPS					10%	5%
EURA						RPS			FPS	4%	3%
GCC						RPS			FPS	4%	3%
IND						RPS			FPS	4%	3%
INDO						RPS			FPS	4%	3%
JAP				RPS		FPS				7%	4%
MENA						RPS			FPS	4%	3%
RU						RPS			FPS	4%	3%
SA						RPS			FPS	4%	3%
SAF				RPS	FPS					7%	5%
SEAO						RPS			FPS	4%	3%
SK				RPS		FPS				7%	4%
SSA						RPS			FPS	4%	3%
UK		Both								20%	20%
USA			RPS	FPS						10%	7%
WEU			RPS		FPS					10%	5%



* reduction in coal generation as a share of 2020 levels

End of deforestation

Example of differences between 1.8°C FPS & 1.5°C RPS in key issue – Deforestation


Deforestation of natural forest halted through strong and effective command and control policy

Countries/regions like CAN, GCC, JAP, SA, SK, UK have virtually zero net deforestation


				Change in forest cover 2		
	2020	2025	2030	IPR FPS 2021	IPR 1.5C RPS	
AU		FPSRPS		3	3	
BRA		RPS	FPS	< 12	16>	
CAN	FPSRPS			1	1	Carbon pricing
CHI		RPS	FPS	92	92	and NDC
CSA		RPS	FPS	<10	14	commitments
EEU		FPSRPS		4	4	
EURA		RPS	FPS	1	2	combine to stop
GCC	FPSRPS			0	0	net deforestation
IND		RPS	FPS	13	13	by 2030.
INDO		RPS	FPS	2	6	Biggest changes
JAP	FPSRPS			0	0	need to occur in
MENA		RPS	FPS	-1	1	
RU		RPS	FPS	1	2	BRZ, CSA, INDO,
SA	FPSRPS			0	0	SEAO, SSA
SAF		RPS	FPS	0	1	
SEAO		RPS	FPS	3	11	
SK	FPSRPS			0	0	
SSA		RPS	FPS	\bigcirc 0	15	
UK	FPSRPS			1	1	
USA		FPSRPS		17	17	
WEU		RPS	FPS	11	12	

The Inevitable Policy Response: Investor Brief for Asset Managers


Achieving 1.5°C with less aggressive action on fossil CO₂ emissions would require substantially more negative emissions technologies (NETs)



Twin forces in the food & ag revolution – decline in ruminant meat and emergence of Nature-based Solutions (NbS) as CO2 removal strategies



- 30% decline in ruminant meat from 2030 to 2050 due to shifts in consumer behavior and some policy support for health and environmental reasons
- Alternative meat reaches 28% market share by 2050, as taste/price parity is achieved in all markets




- Demand for verifiable sequestration drives carbon markets (voluntary, followed by regulatory), supporting an explosion in commercial NbS solutions
- Greatest sequestration expected in China (1.4 Gt), India (0.5 Gt), Sub-Saharan Africa (0.5 Gt), and Brazil (0.4 Gt)



The Value Drivers Database Explained

The IPR Value Drivers Database is the largest and most comprehensive in the world enabling direct input into investor valuation models


- Data summary:
 - All major jurisdictions covered
 - Annualised data
 - Emissions by GHG type
 - Investment by technology type by jurisdiction by sector
 - Power Demand by fuel type by jurisdiction
 - All major sectors covered
 - Huge Land Use component
 - Price data derived
 - Macro-economic assumptions
- Designed in collaboration with IPR Strategic Partners and Research Consortium Partners
- Will facilitate opportunity to build new wave of product
- Hundreds of thousands of data points



- Jurisdiction: 21 world regions including 12 G20 countries
- Countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States
- **Composite regions:** Central and South America, Eastern Europe, Eurasia, Gulf co-operation Council; Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, South East Asia and Oceania, Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe




IPR FPS 2021 – examples of broad capital shift opportunities





GDP impact: Global

World: Gross Domestic Product (GDP)




- The majority of negative final impacts are significantly mitigated by 2050 (see the pink line)
- The next 10 years appear to be crucial to cut emissions but also for economic cost to erupt
- FPS's carbon tax and abatement shocks could have a mild impact in the global economy by 2030 (less than 1.5%)
- This is partly offset by carbon revenue recycling back into the economy (through a combination of debt repayment, transfers, or government investments)



Source: NIGEM based on IPR inputs

Note: Delta is calculated as the relative % difference compared to the baseline scenario ; no physical impacts are included in this analysis.

Dynamics of the investment chain






Asset Consulting Support

Key role of service providers


- Investment Consultants / OCIOs:
 - Asset Owners should assess their investment consultants' climate capacity
 - Investment consultants are critical to developing strategies for climate transition
 - Barriers: perception of "risky advice" and going against traditional SAA approaches
- **Ratings Agencies** Can integrate IPR into ratings analysis (<u>Fitch</u> already doing so)
- Data providers Can build new offerings integrating IPR public data
- Index Providers Can create new benchmarks and semi-passive product
- **Proxy advisers** Can make voting recommendation based on IPR realism



IPR Climate transition integration



Climate transition presents asset managers with fundamental organisational challenges




Asset Manager issues between Net Zero, a realistic forecast and execution

- Clients choose mandates and benchmarks its not your fault!
- If engagement only, how serious are you prepared to get?
- Do active managers really want to divest to meet short term targets?
- Which companies have the best transition plans such that they emerge stronger? Little time to transition to Net Zero for exposed companies!
- Can you renegotiate incentives that allow you to position a low carbon portfolio early, even risking short term underperformance?



Climate transition theme demands sector and asset class matrix analysis



Note: Not market cap weighted and not all sectors have presence in each asset class


RESPONSE

The portfolio carbon switch by asset class

After (including companies in transition) Before Private Markets Public Markets **IPR** benchmarks/ Equities **Equities** Active selection High Corporate FI Green **Corporate Fixed Income Corporate Fixed Income** Carbon Tilt Sovereign FI Green Sovereign Fixed Income Sovereign Fixed Income Tilt **Re-allocate** Infrastructure Infrastructure High Value Add Allocation & recycle **Real Estate** Carbon Green Building Stds **Real Estate** New Tech, LBO, Private Equity Private Equity MBO \$\$ allocation **Relatively Unexposed** High Carbon Assets **Green Assets**

INEVITABLE POLICY

Asset Allocation – do we have barriers to investing in emerging markets where the decarbonization opportunities are?





Key philosophies challenged by the climate transition

Fiduciary duty

- Restriction on ignoring risk adjusted return maximisation?
- Licence to act proactively on climate strategy
- Agency responsibility
 - Who is responsible for establishing a climate strategy?

Some may consider others such as EMH (Efficient Market Hypothesis) or MPT(Markowitz)



Human issues for asset managers to manage and consider

- Culture
- Behaviours
- Incentives
- Career Risk

Informational barriers to taking action on climate change:

• Data, tools, metrics, scientific evidence, knowledge




Behavioural barriers to taking action on climate change:


 Cognitive biases, psychological underpinnings



Whole system view - from asset allocation to company analysis and stock selection



The implications of company transition challenge



Using IPR 1.8°C FPS 2021



Opportunities matrix in key sectors

Opportunities	Equities	Debt	Private Capital	Infrastructure & Energy	Real Assets / NBS
CCS (carbon capture & storage)	Through Oil, Gas, Industrials	Unlisted FF inc coal, sovereign debt, municipal debt	Commercializing technologies	Retrofit for unlisted coal	As part of BECCS (Bioenergy w/CCS) development
EV	Leading auto transitioners	Leading auto transitioners	Batteries, smart car, smart charging	Charging infra, smart grid	N/A
Renewables	For listed utilities	For unlisted utilities	New technologies, smart grid, balancing	New builds	N/A
Hydrogen	Listed utilities/ Industrials 2030s	Early, late-stage debt & transition debt	Development stage PE through to commercialization	N/A	N/A
Clean Industrials	Leading low carbon industrials	Leading low carbon industrials	New technology	N/A	N/A

Note: This does not suggest that all opportunities have only positive environmental or social impact



Opportunities matrix in land use, the 'Elephant' in emissions abatement

Opportunities	Equities	Debt	Private Capital	Infrastructure & Energy	Real Assets / NbS
Forest Conservation and Reforestation	 Food & Ag transitioning away from meat & industrial ag 	 Food & Ag transitioning away from meat & industrial ag Reforestation / afforestation 	 Technology supporting scaling of conservation and reforestation 	Forest conservation & reforestation within infra and energy projects	 Forestry asset class with high sustainability performance Opportunities to invest in carbon markets integrated with forestry investment
Improved Land Management	 Timberland REITS Agribusiness companies 	 Timberland REITS financing Agribusiness companies financing 	 Ag Tech: support scaling of improved land management and soil carbon management Circular bioeconomy technologies (e.g. mass timber) replacing cement, steel, and plastics 	N/A	 Forestry asset class with high sustainability performance Regenerative high sustainability performance agriculture Forest and soil carbon markets integrated with forestry and agricultural investment
Food Production Innovation & Technology	Alt. protein directly or via incumbents investing in such at scale	Commercialisation	Alt. protein for human and animal consumption	N/A	Reallocate unused pasture and grazing land toward climate- positive forestry and climate- positive agriculture

Note: Examples of specific land-use opportunities also found in <u>Capital for Climate</u>, a partner grantee


INEVITABLE POLICY RESPONSE



PACTA Transition Disruption Metric

Visual representation of the TDM*

• If we align with 1.5 deg and we underperform, what happens?



- **Full mitigation (0):** The portfolio is ahead of the FPS scenario pathway.
- Managed mitigation (from 0 to 1): Residual disruption consistent with the effort in years 1 to 5. Over 1, suggests that the portfolio needs to accelerate the transition relative to its current capital stock evolution projections, but this acceleration is in line with historical growth rates of the sector.
- **Managed disruption (1 to 2):** is in line with the FPS acceleration which involves some disruption that is still manageable.
- Unmanaged or high disruption (over 2): An unmanaged or high disruption suggests the portfolio is already lagging the FPS scenario benchmark and will involve significant unmanaged disruption over the next decade if / when the FPS scenario materializes.

See: <u>https://2degrees-investing.org/resource/pacta/</u>

* This visual representation should be considered as an example given that the metric is under construction and may have slight variations.

Using IPR 1.5°C RPS 2021



Aggressive emission reductions required under IPR 1.5°C RPS target one third reduction by 2030

Year	Changes required from 2020 under IPR 1.5°C RPS				
	Energy	Energy and land			
2020	Base Year	Base Year			
2025	-1%	-7%			
2030	-27%	-33%			
2035	-53%	-57%			
2040	-73%	-76%			
2045	-88%	-91%			
2050	-96%	-102%			




Asset Managers – Converting IPR into valuation analysis


(Drawing examples from IPR 2019 analysis)



The asset model draws on results from IPR Phase I to generate financial impacts of the IPR 1.8°C Forecast Policy Scenario across various asset classes, starting with equities



Examples from 2019 Strategic Asset Allocation analysis



Green* and high carbon* indices for Corporate Bonds, Private equity, Read Estate, Equities, and Infrastructure are constructed by applying sector weights to the 90th and 10th percentile of companies (in terms of valuation change in FPS). Sovereign debt Green / high carbon impacts are from 10Y debt from Canada and the Netherlands. Real Estate Green assumes carbon neutral building with no carbon costs, whereas high carbon is average buildings with no abatement.

Equities

Key Findings: Disruption at the Sector and Company level

Mor

impoct

Overall, risk to financial markets is significant, but appears manageable with the iShares MSCI ACWI ETF fall by a noncyclical 3.1% or \$1.6trn

This includes downside demand and cost exposure of \$2.1trn (or a 4% fall in share values) offset by about \$0.5trn from green demand creation.

The most disruption is seen at sector and company level, with some big winners and losers

Some primary sectors will be pure losers or winners – mean company valuations in the energy sector fall by 33%

Within other sectors there is large variation across companies, for example, 80% of impacts in the Utilities sector lie between -62% to 41% of current valuation

> Many companies likely to succeed in the green upside are not listed in the common indices

If repricing occurs in 2025, when the policy forecasts start to affect cash flows of companies, the impact further rises to -4.5%.

Increased volatility is also likely with a more event-driven price adjustment so the impact could be more significant

Non-OECD domiciled companies are more negatively affected on average – although in some regions (like China) this may reflect the lack of listed vehicles.

Nevertheless, at a country domicile level there is significant dispersion of results – for example, in the United States

Passive investors are therefore unlikely to be as exposed to the upside as the downside of the Inevitable Policy Response.

How do we think about the 'impacts' of the Inevitable Policy Response?

3

Current valuations



Current equity valuations are based on expectations of future company performance. We assume these expectations are consistent with a scenario where current NDCs* as reflected in the IEA NPS (now STEPs) are achieved.



We then define 'impacts' as the implied changes in valuation in terms of market capitalisation if investors repriced immediately on the basis of these expected cash flow changes **


The IPR Forecast Policy Scenario (FPS)

The IPR FPS was developed to show the macro and sector level impacts of a specific set of policy forecasts taking affect around the time of the 2025 Paris Agreement 'ratchet'. These generate impacts to company profits going forward due to changes in demand, prices and costs for companies.

Notes: *NDCs refer to countries' nationally determined contributions to the Paris Agreement.**Immediately is our default assumption in this report but we set sensitivities around delayed repricing in 2025 as well. Source: Vivid Economics

2

To arrive at a quantitative estimate, the approach estimates annual impacts on profits from 2020 to 2050 and discounts these back to the present




Notes: Current valuation is assumed to be the NPV of projected profits to 2050 based on a 'business as usual' policy scenario where countries implement their stated policies (or NDCs), akin to what is represented in the IEA STEPS (formerly NPS). While in reality, different equities may be valued based on different expectations of a future climate pathway, this assumption is necessary to provide 'value at risk' figures relative to a baseline.

Source: Vivid Economics

Value (constant US\$)

The 1.8°C Forecast Policy Scenario starts impacting equity valuations in 2025, but repricing could occur any time from now to 2025



The demand creation value stream captures

emissions products or inputs (such as EVs,

the effects of increasing demand for low

copper and renewable energy equipment).

and the extent of overall market growth.

These impacts will depend on **a company's**

current and future share of green markets,

The value streams capture the dynamics of the transition, which affects production costs directly through carbon pricing and indirectly through demand changes


Demand destruction Demand creation Cost and competition The demand destruction value stream captures the impact of the **contraction in demand for high emissions products** due to climate policy (such as ICEs and fossil fuels).

These impacts will depend on a company's sensitivity to falling **commodity prices and margins**, which will be tied to **production horizons and cost structures**


Cost and competition captures the **carbon costs companies face directly from Scope 1 emissions,** and **indirectly through power prices**.

Impacts will depend on a company's emissions intensity, abatement opportunities and capacity to pass through costs to consumers, relative to competitors.*


Notes: * The cost pass through and competition elements also apply to costs from demand destruction and demand creation models. Source: Vivid Economics 2019 Example: the impact on the current value of the world index was modest in percentage terms, although it implies that US\$1.6 trillion (over half of UK GDP) would be wiped off the index



Note: Carbon revenues are government revenues from carbon pricing (see State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2019, World Bank). Detail on timing of repricing can be found in the Technical Annex. Source: Vivid Economics Net Zero Toolkit




- The bottom 10% of companies face significant demand destruction and suffer from carbon costs
- The top 10% of companies experience significant demand creation and benefit from a carbon cost advantage






<u>2019 Sectoral Example</u>: Overall index-level impacts are small in percentage terms since the majority of companies in the index are in sectors with low exposure to climate policy




Further detail on losing sectors provided in slide 24


* Finance sector impacts do not include impacts on financial holdings. ** Consumer Non-Cyclicals include Agriculture. This sector is explored further in the sector insights section. *** Consumer Cyclicals include Automobiles (see sector results for further detail). Source: Vivid Economics Net Zero Toolkit

2019 Sectoral Example: Within-sector variation can be significant, particularly for the four most impacted sectors in the index: Energy, Consumer Cyclicals, Non-Energy Materials and Utilities



Notes: Error bars indicate the 10th and 90th percentiles of impact within each sector. Sectors: RBICS level 1. Source: Vivid Economics Net Zero Toolkit







* The special interest sectors are contained Consumer Non-Cyclicals. Agriculture is a Level 3 subsector, Food production a Level 4 subsector. Sector shares are not available as results for the 'Agriculture' sector are based on oversampling of companies – there are very few agriculture companies in the index.

** Utilities sector broken down to RBICS level 3 to provide further detail. *** Upstream energy includes coal mining and oil and gas exploration and production.

2019 Example - Fossil fuels: The majority of impacts on fossil fuels come from squeezed profit margins from falling prices, rather than reductions in the quantity produced



Notes: The error bar on the left graph indicates the 10th and 90th percentiles of impact in the sector. Value of the dot is weighted average impact. *The energy sector includes upstream, downstream and midstream sectors and cover oil, gas and coal production Source: Vivid Economics Net Zero Toolkit Example outcomes for companies driven by the IPR Forecast Policy levers*, particularly the coal and ICE phase-out, carbon pricing and zero-carbon power



Source: Vivid Economics analysis


Utilities with more renewable generation gain at the expense of emissions intensive fossil fuel generators, and oil & gas suffer predominantly from falling demand

Company (anonymised)	Description	Company emissions intensity / market intensity*	Current valuation	Value streams			Total FPS
				Demand destruction	Demand creation	Carbon costs	impact
÷4; A	Utility (primarily renewable generation)	0.31	100%	-0.1%	0.4%	40.9%	41.3%
і 4 :	Utility (primarily coal generation)	3.71	100%	0.0%	rene	-62.5% mall ewable	-61.5%
c	Integrated Oil & Gas	0.39	100%	-27.2%	equi	ipment siness 3.6%	-22.2%


Note: * This is the emissions intensity (Scope 1 + Scope 2) of the company divided by the average emissions intensity of the market. Source: Vivid Economics analysis

Corporate Debt


Key Findings: Corporate debt impacts are modest as most issued bonds mature before the FPS kicks in, which presents a realignment opportunity for investors



Changes in company fundamentals arising from the FPS affect default risk and as a result corporate bond valuations




Overall impacts are modest relative to equities as most issued bonds pay out before impacts kick in – the majority of analysed bonds have a maturity under 5 years




*Equity is based on the iShares MSCI ACWI ETF, Issued corporate bonds** represents bonds issued by companies within the iShares MSCI ACWI ETF Source: Vivid Economics (Net-zero toolkit)

However, as with equities, within-sector variation can be significant, particularly for: energy, non-energy Materials and utilities



Notes: Error bars indicate the 10th and 90th percentiles of impact within each sector. Sectors: RBICS level 1. Issued corporate bonds* represents bonds issued by companies within the iShares MSCI ACWI ETF Source: Vivid Economics (Net-Zero Toolkit) Beyond company fundamental, discussed in the equities release, variation in impacts can be explained by differences credit ratings and maturities*



*Due to the lack of availability of long dated corporate bonds >10y the impacts on 30y debt is assessed through "hypothetical" bonds. Overall market oh corporate bonds >10y is very small. Source: Vivid Economics (Net-Zero Toolkit)

Sovereign Debt

Key Findings: Sovereign bonds tend to rally under the 1.8C FPS as increases in risk premia are offset by central banks cutting interest rates in response to the policy shock

Kime to

QOC[†]

rote

Interest -

Spimpac

bt/c

Sovereign bonds rally for most countries under the FPS as increases in credit risk are dominated by lower interest rates

For example, an average tenor US bond* is expected to increase in price by 0.01% under the FPS

> Bonds with longer maturity experience larger price changes as coupon payments occur further into the FPS

> > Central bank response is critical Value adjustments depend heavily on how central banks respond to the FPS and investors should monitor how this develops

Interest rates fall as central banks respond to a growing output gap driven by the FPS

Inflation rise but the decrease in real interest rates dominates


Increasing debt issuance drives up debt/GDP ratios and therefore credit risk premia

In most cases the fall in nominal risk-free interest rates dominates causing bond yields to fall except for countries already running large debt/GDP, for example, Canada

Reduce exposure to some countries Investors should reduce exposure to longer dated bonds issued by fossil fuel exporting countries with high debt/GDP ratios


The analysis done on sovereign bond issuance assumes locally issued debt *Average tenor US bond is 6 years to maturity

The sovereign bond methodology captures the dynamics of transition, by modelling changes bond risk factors through changes in macroeconomic variables and policy




- The Taylor rule in the macroeconomic model (G-Cubed) used in this analysis leads to lower interest rates as central banks optimise over lower output vs higher inflation, induced by carbon pricing policies.
- The diagram above depicts the *generic* impacts of the FPS on sovereign bond risk factors, but these vary by country.
- Current macroeconomic conditions and FPS impacts differ by country, therefore policy response (fiscal and monetary) differ by country as well.

Macroeconomic shocks and policy responses change nominal interest rates and credit risk premia which lead to a repricing of sovereign bonds




Macroeconomic modelling for the IPR FPS was conducted using G-Cubed, a multi-country, multi-sector intertemporal general equilibrium model of the global economy

<u>2019 Example -</u> In isolation, bond prices can fall significantly from rising debt/GDP as the sovereign default risk premia increases




<u>2019 Example -</u> Full valuation impacts vary significantly across countries and by maturity, with longer-dated bonds having larger impacts, but most bonds rally under FPS



For bonds with tenors of 5 years or less, there is no impact as FPS scenario impacts materialise after 2025 Current (04/02/2020) yields are taken from Thomson Reuters Source: Vivid Economics (Net-Zero Toolkit)


<u>2019 Example -</u> Higher credit risk can drive bond value reductions, but this is only for a small subset of highly exposed and leveraged countries such as Canada




For bonds with tenors of 5 years or less, there is no impact as FPS scenario impacts materialise after 2025 Current (04/02/2020) yields are taken from Thomson Reuters Source: Vivid Economics (Net-Zero Toolkit)

Real Estate

Key Findings: Real estate is almost as exposed as equities with impacts concentrated in commercial real estate and regions with high emissions intensity



<u>2019 Example -</u> Low-emission properties become increasingly attractive under the FPS as carbon pricing increases energy bills



As energy costs rise, differentiating factors will become increasingly important for individual investors. Factors which will affect property level impacts include:



000

Physical characteristics: e.g. age, location, energy consumption by source, historic energy efficiency refurbishment expenditure*

Sensitivity of demand to price changes (by building type)

Building-level market value (current), discount rates used in current valuations

Note: figures assume constant scope 2 emissions intensity – any reduction in scope 2 emissions intensity will reduce carbon costs. *If none of the above: average CO_2 emissions (by building type)


Infrastructure

<u>2019 Example - Large parts of global infrastructure is built for the high carbon economy</u> and therefore exposed to the FPS

The iShares Global Infrastructure index falls by -11%, which is significantly larger than the impact to listed equity of -3.1%

Infrastructure assets are typically investor specific but by exposure can be understood through proxy infrastructure equity indices

Infrastructure impacts are large as the asset class is **more exposed to sectors that are significantly impacted from the FPS**, for example Utilities (-14%) and Energy (-29%). However cleaner infrastructure assets provide potentially large opportunities for targeted investors



Private Equity


<u>2019 Example - Private equity is likely to capture more green upside through smaller</u> cleantech companies

The impact to a proxy **private equity portfolio based on a representative portfolio of small and mid-cap** listed equities **is -0.7%** which is smaller than the impact to listed equity of -3.1% **Private equity assets are investor specific** but broad exposure can be understood through the use of small and mid-caps as proxies

Private equity impacts are relatively small at the asset class level. The asset class is more exposed to cleantech companies in the industrials sector (relative to MSCI ACWI), which shows modest gains these are cancelled out by losses in energy

Large potential upside by investing in growing cleantech companies that have not matured to listed indexes that tend to contain more established firms. Investors also need to be cautious of "dirty" energy firms in the sector which experience losses <u>2019 Example -</u> Private equity investment is disproportionately higher in industrial sectors which are more likely to benefit from cleantech growth, leading to a small overall impact

Sector breakdown



As private equity is owner specific, there is limited data available.

This analysis **constructs a private equity portfolio based on a representative portfolio of small and mid-cap** listed equities, with firm size and sector exposure based on the average private equity holdings***

The private equity portfolio **is more exposed to smaller cleantech companies**' in the industrials sector. **Private equity is also more exposed to "cleaner" sectors** for example consumer and business services (10%), relative to listed equity

Other* includes technology, healthcare, consumer products, business services, financial services, leisure services, real estate, transport, construction, defence and agriculture

Notes: **listed equity based on MSCI ACWI ETF *PE portfolio based on a representative portfolio of small and mid-cap listed equities, with firm size and sector exposure based on <u>https://www.pwc.de/en/private-equity/private-equity-trend-report-2020.html</u>


Legal disclaimer

The information contained in this report is meant for the purposes of information only and is not intended to be investment, legal, tax or other advice, nor is it intended to be relied upon in making an investment or other decision. This report is provided with the understanding that the authors and publishers are not providing advice on legal, economic, investment or other professional issues and services. Unless expressly stated otherwise, the opinions, recommendations, findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this report are those of the various contributors to the report and do not necessarily represent the views of PRI Association or the signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment. The inclusion of company examples does not in any way constitute an endorsement of these organisations by PRI Association or the signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment. While we have endeavoured to ensure that the information contained in this report has been obtained from reliable and up-to-date sources, the changing nature of statistics, laws, rules and regulations may result in delays, omissions or inaccuracies in information contained in this report. PRI Association is not responsible for any errors or omissions, or for any decision made or action taken based on information contained in this report or for any loss or damage arising from or caused by such decision or action. All information in this report is provided "as-is", with no guarantee of completeness, accuracy, timeliness or of the results obtained from the use of this information, and without warranty of any kind, expressed or implied.

Vivid Economics and Energy Transition Advisors are not investment advisers and makes no representation regarding the advisability of investing in any particular company, investment fund or other vehicle. The information contained in this research report does not constitute an offer to sell securities or the solicitation of an offer to buy, or recommendation for investment in, any securities within the United States or any other jurisdiction. This research report provides general information only. The information is not intended as financial advice, and decisions to invest should not be made in reliance on any of the statements set forth in this document. Vivid Economics and Energy Transition Advisors shall not be liable for any claims or losses of any nature in connection with information contained in this document, including but not limited to, lost profits or punitive or consequential damages. The information and opinions in this report constitute a judgement as at the date indicated and are subject to change without notice. The information may therefore not be accurate or current. The information and opinions contained in this report have been compiled or arrived at from sources believed to be reliable in good faith, but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made by Vivid Economics or Energy Transition Advisors as to their accuracy, completeness or correctness and Vivid Economics and Energy Transition Advisors do also not warrant that the information is up to date.

APPENDICES

IPR role for investors in the climate landscape




Progress to date

Thematic highlights

Clean energy shares jumped 142% in 2020, while oil shares fell

WilderHill New Energy Global Innovation Index (NEX) versus NYSE Arca Oil Index, full year 2020 (rebased)



Thematic highlights

The market value of clean energy ETFs jumped 10-fold in 2020

Dollar market cap and number of shares outstanding in nine global clean energy ETFs, full year 2020 (rebased)



Source: BloombergNEF. NEX is WilderHill New Energy Global Innovation Index

INEVITABLE


RESPONSE

POLICY

Progress to date - Bloomberg

Energy transition investment: renewable energy

Global renewable energy investment running at around \$300 billion a year



Energy transition investment: electrified transport


Global outlays on electric vehicles and charging infrastructure are rising



Thematic highlights


Sustainable debt issued for green proceeds nears \$500 billion per annum

Green bond, sustainability bond and green loan issuance



Energy transition investment: hydrogen

Investment in hydrogen fell in 2020 on a lower level of fuel-cell bus deployments






Bloomberg NEO data

Energy transition investment: carbon capture and storage

Just a few projects represent most of the investment in CCS since 2018

Global investment in CCS by sector



Source: BloombergNEF. Note: expenditure commitments considered only if recipient is announced.

Thematic highlights

16

14

12

10

6


4

2

0

Investment by oil and gas companies has held up during the pandemic

Clean energy investment by oil and gas companies, 2015-2020



Source: BlooombergNEF, company disclosures. Note: analysis includes all completed deals, and estimated values for undisclosed deals. CCS data excludes non-commercial projects that have not disclosed investment values. Asset finance data may overstate investment by each company where project equity shares have not been disclosed.



Example risks: China power and investors – its all about debt

- President Xi Jinping's estimated \$21 trillion carbon neutrality pledge
- Highly leveraged, dubious transition strategy but with the implicit Chinese government guarantee priced in to give solid ratings (A+/Stable)
- The five biggest state-backed power firms have announced plans to develop about 305 gigawatts of new wind and solar capacity in the next five years, according to BloombergNEF, almost twice the amount it estimates the U.S. will install over the same period. At peak generation, the total being added would be about enough to power the whole of Japan


"2021 WILL BE A YEAR FOR RE-CALIBRATING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT DEFAULT RISK FOR CHINESE SOEs. Fixed income investors

learned some tough lessons in 2020 about the Chinese government's newfound willingness to let SOEs default on debt obligations." Source: IEEFA

Chinese Power Producers Issue Green Bonds

Issuers also plan to add new coal-fired power capacity





Largest Coal-Fired Power Plant Owners

Globally, Huaneng ranks second in generation capacity
China Energy
Investment Group
China Huaneng
China Huadian
China Datang
State Power
Investment Corp.

Source: Global Energy Monitor IEEFA



The IPR Forecast Policy Scenario (FPS) forecasts higher policy ambition across eight policy levers

In March 2021, the IPR FPS update was informed by a rigorous evidence review and large-scale survey of country climate policy experts

SCarbon pricing	Coal phase-out	100% clean power	Zero emission vehicles
 Carbon taxes Emissions trading systems Border carbon adjustments 	 Prohibiting regulations Emissions performance standards Electricity market reforms 	 100% clean power targets Renewables capacity auctions and other support policies 	 100% zero emission vehicle (ZEV) sales legislation Manufacturer ZEV obligations ZEV consumer subsidies
Low-carbon buildings	Clean industry	 Low-emissions agriculture 	Forestry
 Prohibiting regulations for fossil fuel heating systems Purchase subsidies for low- carbon heating systems Thermal efficiency regulations for new build and retrofit Minimum energy performance standards for new appliances 	 Emissions performance standards for industrial plant Subsidy for new or retrofit clean industrial processes 	 Methane or nitrous oxide emissions tax or cap-and-trade system Subsidy for low-emissions agricultural practices and technologies Farmer education and technical assistance programmes 	 Strong policy action against deforestation, such as monitoring and penalties, supported by consumer pressure Incentives for reforestation and afforestation via domestic action and carbon markets

